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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines how governance mechanisms are used by firms to reduce supplier 
opportunism and improve buyer performance. Using a research context of medium-to-large 
manufacturing, the author investigates how opportunism can be reduced by formal and 
informal governance mechanism. Eight in-depth interviews with procurement managers were 
carried out to provide a unique, rich understanding of the phenomena. Through an agency 
theory perspective, we find that formal and informal governance approaches needs to be 
considered as compliments rather than mutually exclusive approaches, in order to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour. 
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Introduction 
Opportunistic behaviour remains one of the main challenges for supply chain management. It 
can significantly harm the buyer-supplier relationship, by creating uncertainty and raising 
transaction costs (Williamson, 2008), but despite the obvious implications for performance, 
empirical research on opportunism in supply chains is limited. The fundamental problem of 
opportunism is one of asymmetric information, where suppliers have better knowledge of 
their own processes and costs than the buyer. This creates an opportunity for suppliers to 
shirk and poach, which in involves deceiving buyers by artificial increase unit costs, use 
cheaper materials, withhold resources, deliberately under perform, and violate buyers’ 
confidentiality  (Handley and Benton Jr., 2012). The seminal work of Williamson (1985), and 
later Nooteboom (1996), Carson et al. (2006), and Wathne and Heide (2000), however, 
suggest that opportunism behaviour can be overcome, or at least significantly reduced, by the 
use of appropriate contracts and governance mechanisms. In this respect, governance 
mechanism refers to the formal and informal rules of exchange between partners (North, 
1990; Vandaele et al., 2007). Existing studies have highlighted at least three types of 
governance mechanism. At one end of the spectrum are formal contracts, which pre-specify 
the rules and duties of each partner (Liu et al., 2009). At the other end of the spectrum is 
relational capital.  
In this study we explore (i) the extent to which governance mechanisms can reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and improve performance; and (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of 
different types of governance mechanism. We do so, by using a primary data set consisting of 
eight semi-structured interviews with purchasing managers from eight companies in the 
manufacturing sector.  
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Background and conceptualisation 
The concept of opportunism has played a significant role in the supply chain literature, and 
the seminal work of Williamson (1979, 1985) describes opportunism through the theoretical 
lense of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Here, opportunism is a result of information 
asymmetry, where one or both parties to a relationship may try to act opportunistically when 
a chance arise and if it is deemed to be profitable for the party to do so. Typical opportunistic 
behaviour may include lying, cheating, stealing, shirking, withholding or distorting 
information and violations of relational contracts (Brown et al., 2000; Cai et al., 2009; 
Wathne and Heide, 2000). As such, opportunism is the “self-seeking interest with guile” (Liu 
et al., 2009, p. 294), and can be detrimental to the operational and financial performance of 
the firm (buyer).  
 One way of minimising chances of opportunistic behaviour is by using appropriate 
governance mechanism. These are “mode[s] of organizing transactions” (Williamson and 
Ouchi 1981, cited in Heide, 1994: 71) and is “a multidimensional phenomenon, 
encompassing the initiation, termination and on-going relationship maintenance between a set 
of parties” (Heide, 1994: 72). They have particularly gained considerable attention in recent 
years, partly because of  globalisaitona nd the growing number of inter-firm exchanges (Kale 
et al., 2002; Vlaar et al., 2007), and partly because of a desire to reduce uncertainty and 
conflicts in buyer-supplier relationships, in order to promote stability (Cai et al., 2009; Liu et 
al., 2009). Existing studies have emphasised two common form of governance: (i) formal 
contracting, which is based on legally binding obligations and supplier evolutions; and (ii) 
relational capital, which is a ‘softer’ governance mechanism which emphasis trust and 
communication between the two parties.  
 The extent to which the two approaches are compliments or substitutes are still under 
considerable debate. For example, Poppa and Zenger (2002) note that a large body of the 
existing literature believe that relational capital eliminates the need for formal contracts, and 
vice versa. In addition, they note that existing studies have argued that formal contracts 
hinder the development of relational capital altogether.  However, Cai et al. (2009) argue that 
relational mechanism are not adequate for effective conflict management, even if the buyer-
supplier relationship is a very cooperative one. They further stress that formal contracts can 
be necessary for firms, as they specify the exact rights and duties of each partner and resort to 
third parties to provide punishment to those engaging in opportunistic behaviour (Cai et al., 
2009).   
Further, some scholars argue that relational mechanisms are not adequate for effective 
conflict management in all cases, even if the relationship is a very cooperative one (Cai et al., 
2009). It is stressed that formal contracts are essential for firms if they are unable to agree on 
a solution. They specify the exact rights and duties of each partner and resort to third parties 
to provide punishment to those engaging in opportunistic behaviour (Cai et al., 2009).  
 
Formal governance  
Formal contracting (governance) is particular useful from a transaction cost (Williamson, 
1985) agency theory (Lafontaine, 1992) perspective, as they allow buyers to obtain some 
control over exchange partners (Vlaar et al., 2007) and protect transaction specific assets (Liu 
et al., 2009). Existing studies have suggested that formal agreement and contracting can 
reduce opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships (e.g. Handley and Benton Jr., 2012; 
Wathne and Heide, 2000). These are legally binding contracts, which specify rights, 
responsibilities and expectations of both parties in the relationship (Lee and Cavusgil, 2006; 
Liu et al., 2009; Roath et al., 2002). In so doing, they restrict discretionary activities of 
supplier and hence reduce opportunities to cheat, deceive or shirk. In addition, formal 
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contracts explicitly stipulate the promises or obligations of the exchange, monitor on-going 
behaviour, determine how foreseeable future situations with be handled, and define the 
course of action in the event of unforeseeable circumstances or conflict (Liu et al., 2009; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In turn, this decreases uncertainty and stabilises relationships, 
particularly in turbulent environments (Lee and Cavusgil, 2006).  
 The role of formal contracts is twofold. First, to emphasise the legal and economic 
consequences of self-seeking interest activities. Second, to increase transparency within 
relationships (e.g.  Cai et al., 2009; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006; Mellevigt et al., 2007; Vlaar et 
al., 2007). Moreover, formal contracts are often in place in order to limit any gains from 
opportunistic behaviour, as they contain more clearly articulated clauses and specified 
sanctions for as many unforeseen circumstances and contingencies as possible (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Roath et al., 2002). As such, formal contracts reduce incentives to cheat, 
deceive or shirk. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of formal contracts rests on their content.  For 
example, Poppa and Zenger (2002, p. 712) note that if contracts are vague and ambiguous it 
“heightens the incentives for short-run cheating and lowers expectations of cooperation”.  
This may also explain why existing studies have found mixed results on the effectiveness of 
formal contractual on reducing opportunism (Cavusgil et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2003), 
because it is impossible to anticipate all potential outcomes no matter how detailed and 
complex the terms of the contract (Macneil, 1978). 
 
Informal governance   
 
Alternatively, or simultaneously, firms can also use informal governance mechanisms as a 
method of reducing opportunistic behaviour in the supply chain (Kim et al., 2010). Often, 
such informal mechanisms has been categorised as ‘relational based’ and they emphasise 
shared values, norms and standards of expected behaviour between organisations that are 
developed through social interaction (Liu et al., 2009: 295). These governance mechansims 
are closely related to the notion of social capital, which generates “goodwill between buyer 
and sellers” (Cousins, 2006; 852), and has been associated with greater trust, respect, more 
open communication (i.e. relational capital), and reduces uncertainty, conflict and the 
likelihood of opportunistic behaviour (Cousins et al., 2008). In turn, this can lead to 
significant performance benefits for both buyers as it can reduce overall and greater 
flexibility, whereas for the supplier they are incentivised to work more efficiently due to 
increases in information sharing and joint training improvements (Cousins et al., 2006; Zajac 
and Olsen, 1993). 
  
Given this discussion, our starting premise is that opportunism on the part of the supplier will 
(negatively) influence the buyers performance. However, the risk of opportunism can be 
mitigated by appropriate governance mechanism – notably formal and informal approaches. 
These is illustrated in our initial conceptual framework in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Initial conceptual framework  
 
Research Methodology  
Given the limited empirical research examining the impact of contractual and relational 
governance on opportunism, the research deploys an abductive research approach through in-
depth case studies (Yin, 2003). The logic of abduction is that the research process commutes 
between theories and practice as an interweaving dialogue between theory and empirical 
findings. A multiple case study design is particularly useful when addressing the holistic 
nature of real-world contexts and largely unexplored phenomena (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007), providing a source of rich data into the phenomenon under investigation (Suddaby, 
2006). These phenomena are investigated in their natural context, generating rich primary 
and secondary datasets which are particularly important for the measurement of complex and 
intangible phenomena such as relational captial. We applied theoretical sampling in selecting 
our cases to highlight theoretical issues and to challenge the theory being tested (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Procurement managers were selected due to their pivotal strategic role in managing 
supply chain partners (Cousin et al., 2006), and it is presumed that their individual opinions 
will be a function of their firm roles (Paulraj et al., 2008). The Fame database, which lists 
financial information and contact details of private and public companies in the UK and 
Ireland, was used to obtain the sample. The UK Standard Industrial Classification (2007) was 
used to ensure only firms who are engaged in economic activity of ‘manufacturing’ and those 
with an employee number of over 250 in the previous year were included. The current study 
included only medium to large firms as they are more likely to practice the phenomenon of 
interest (Paulraj et al., 2008). The empirical element of this paper stems from eight discrete 
case studies of companies across manufacturing industries.  
 
Overall, 16 semi-structured interviews with key informants lasting between one to two hours 
were conducted. The semi-structured interview protocol was operationalized in stages. At the 
Opportunism	
(of	supplier)	
Supply	chain	
performance	
Formal	 Informal	
RQ1	
RQ2	
Governance	mechanisms	
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beginning of each interview the participant was briefly reminded of the purpose and primary 
interest of the study in order to ensure the initial approach was clear from the outset. 
Anonymity and confidentiality were assured, and the interviewer asked for their permission 
to record the discussion. The interview guide consisted of six main sections. Each section 
corresponded directly with a respective concept in the conceptual framework. The first 
section was used to establish understanding of governance in the supply chain. This was 
followed by questions relating to relationship building with suppliers, supplier evaluation, 
contracts, supplier misbehaviour and finally supplier relationship performance. The 
interviews concluded by inviting the respondent to provide any further comments or ask 
questions of the interviewer, before each respondent was thanked for their participation in the 
study. Interview data reliability was further strengthened through triangulation of data 
sources including secondary sources such as company documentation and industry reports. In 
order to address construct validity and to increase case study rigor, this study deployed 
different remedies: using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of events, and 
having key informants review individual case reports (Gibbert et al., 2008). Our rich primary 
and secondary datasets were coded into major thematic categories and concepts (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). The data was open, axial and selective coded, summarized and displayed in an 
iterative fashion (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Specific coding included contextual variables 
and the level of significance attached to the use of relational and contractual governance and 
their impact on opportunism. Our empirical findings were continually compared with the 
conceptual framework to check pattern matching (Yin, 2003). In order to focus on one 
category at a time and to investigate the relationships between core concepts we used axial 
coding (Strauss, 1987). Subsequently, the coding process informed the structure of this 
study’s findings and discussion sections.  
 
4. Case findings 
Interviewees across investigated cases frequently referred to various self-interest seeking 
behaviours common of their suppliers. Most of these were found to be poor service, quality, 
delivery and communication, in addition to other commonly encountered problems such as 
hidden charges, not delivering to cost, and price increases. The general consensus amongst 
the interviewees is that opportunistic behaviour detrimentally affects the performance of the 
firm. “Ignoring specification can mean having to send the whole truck back and delaying all 
orders... It can be very damaging to our day-to-day running and if it’s large enough, to our 
monthly performance.” Similarly, interviewees mentioned that: “Poor communication by 
them means bad business for us […]. It absolutely affects our business […] Everything from 
not delivering in a timely fashion to the quality being poor, it all then makes us look bad in 
what happens further down the line to our customers”. Unsurprisingly, the most important 
elements in contracts according to participants are supplier performance measures, such as 
response time, right specification and delivery scores. This emphasises the value in contracts 
in facilitating the co-alignment of goals between buyers and their suppliers. Many of the 
respondents believe that formal contracts play an essential role in buyer-supplier relationships 
and highlight their importance in safeguarding against supplier misbehaviour and major 
violations. For instance, one interviewee mentioned: “You need to know there is recourse, 
not just soothing words, in the event that one of your suppliers lets you down. They are 
[contracts] almost a necessary evil in my experience frankly, but you cannot move without 
them in most instances.” Contracts were seen by some firms as “the last resort” as illustrated 
in the following quote: “If it is something a bit more extraneous, you have got the contract 
and you would deal with it that way, but we do not like doing that”.  
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One respondent does not use legally-binding contracts to any extent. The reasoning behind 
this is because “they are very difficult to manage and maintain” and “are very static”. The 
interviewee further justified the lack of use by asserting that: “With all our suppliers we have 
got a good understanding and if people have got a problem or an issue they will talk about it 
[…] We have always managed to resolve all our issues outside contracts”. The remainder of 
the respondents do use contracts in buyer-supplier relationships. Opposing views emerged 
from the interviews in terms of how helpful contracts are in managing supplier behaviour and 
limiting opportunism. A participant maintained the ineffectiveness of contracts due to their 
inflexible nature, stating that: “All relationships are signed with a contract […] however, 
they constantly change and people rarely stick to the initial plan so they are a difficult tool to 
use to ensure things will work as in the contract”. Even those who extensively use contracts 
with suppliers acknowledge the manifold shortcomings. The following comment from 
another participant reflects this common perception: “You do get bogged down in paperwork 
with contract agreements. Some of them are very long winded and complicated”.  
The destructive implications of using contracts to govern buyer-supplier relationships were 
also frequently derided by the interviewees: “We do not, rightly or wrongly, go looking into 
the contracts very often. We think it’s kind of damaging;” “In my experience, if you are 
having to go back to using a contract to govern supplier behaviour something’s not quite 
right somewhere”. Through these weaknesses, it is evident that purchasing managers feel as 
though contracts used solely on their own are not very effective in governing relationships. 
This is not to say that the interviewees believe that contracts do not have a place in managing 
opportunistic behaviour on part of supply chain partners. Respondents feel as though 
contracts are only effective to limit opportunism, and therefore improve buyer performance, 
when used in combination with other governance mechanisms in order to offset their 
disadvantages. 
 
All the respondents believe that relationship building and the development of relational 
capital are major factors in effectively governing supplier behaviour. Indeed, several 
respondents even claimed it is “the most important factor” or “the most effective tool”. 
Frequent and open communication emerged as a recurrent theme from the interviews in order 
to gain an understanding of each other and build effective relationships with supply chain 
partners. It was commonly held that when issues arise with suppliers, open communication is 
the most effective way in resolving opportunistic behaviour: “It’s all about communication 
really, and understanding what the issues are with the product… the only way we can get 
around these things is through open communication”. In terms of preventing opportunistic 
behaviour, another interviewee expressed their opinion that this was achieved “through 
clarity in of information and what we expect from suppliers”. Open dialogue between buyer 
firms and their suppliers allows them to establish shared goals and increase information 
sharing. The presence of trust surfaced as another factor in relational governance to prevent 
opportunism in suppliers. One interviewee expressed that “by using people you trust so you 
prevent the violation rather than let it happen and have to deal with it”. Several respondents 
point out that mutual trust and respect are evident in more collaborative relationships and 
with key suppliers. Trust takes time to build between partners and so those suppliers that they 
invest the effort in building relationships with are more likely to understand one another 
better and develop relational capital. Aspects of socialisation help a number of firms in 
fostering goal co-alignment and result in the creation of relational norms. An interviewee 
explained their use of formal socialisation and the perceived benefits this can bring: “We are 
very proactive about offering onsite health and safety tuition and workshops to try and bring 
these characters into line with the way of thinking that we have to think… it develops a bit of 
bonding as well”. 
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Cooperative relationships with suppliers are found to improve the management of 
opportunistic behaviour and conflict resolution. It is evident that this then leads to more 
efficient operations thus enhancing buyer performance. The following quote support this 
notion: “A lot of our suppliers are very accepting of us when we contact them and 
communicate their quality issues with them, and they’re also very forthcoming to find 
resolutions when we contact them regarding late supply or supply that’s not up to quality.” 
Similarly, “generally it comes down to that goodwill bit. If you have got a good relationship 
with suppliers they will acknowledge their error and fix it.” The interviews confirm that 
effectively building relational capital generates many benefits within buyer-supplier 
relationships. Most importantly, in the context of this study, the effective building of 
relational capital appears to limit opportunistic behaviour on part of supplier and improve 
buyer performance. 
 
Discussion  
From a theoretical perspective, the findings generally confirm conceptual work of the past.  
More specifically, we find that in order for governance mechanism to be effective in reducing 
opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, evaluation is necessary at various stages of the 
relationship. It is not sufficient to rely on suppler selection criteria to prevent opportunism. 
On-going monitoring of supplier adherence to desired outcomes is needed to truly benefit the 
buyer and enhance their performance. In relation to contractual governance mechanisms, the 
findings from the current study also reflect the opposing views commonly held in the 
literature, with regards to the question of whether contracts are useful from both a 
performance and opportunism perspective (Brown et al., 2000; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006). For 
example, we found that formal contracts are best used in combination with other governance 
tools in order to resolve issues with rigidity and complexity. A number of related studies have 
also documented the benefits in simultaneously employing formal contracts with other 
governance structures (e.g. Cai et al., 2009; Liu et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Further, this study maintains that relational capital is of highest importance in governing 
buyer-supplier relationships. Various communication aspects were found to be vital in 
preventing and mitigating opportunistic behaviour, as well as assisting conflict resolution, to 
ensure the success of the relationship and to enhance performance outcomes for the buyer. 
The findings align with studies, such as Cousins et al. (2008) and Paulraj et al. (2008), in 
supporting the presence of trust, respect, and open communication to facilitate more 
cooperative relationships and bring about greater benefits for both partners. 
 
The managerial implications of this research show that managers should focus their efforts on 
activities that will build relational capital with their supply chain partners. Transactional 
mechanisms, including formal contracts, can be effective in reducing opportunism on part of 
suppliers. However, this research implies that such mechanisms should be supplemented by 
aiming to enhance other structures, particularly relational aspects of the exchange. Frequent 
and open communication is of most importance to promote cooperation and commitment 
between partners. It is also fundamental in resolving partner conflict more efficiently. The 
findings from this study suggest to managers that evaluating suppliers on an on-going basis is 
more effective in not only detecting opportunistic behaviour, but also preventing it from 
happening in the first place.  
 
Conclusion 
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In this study, we explore how formal and informal governance mechanism can reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and thereby improve buyer performance. Using primary interview 
data from eight manufacturing firms. We find compelling evidence to suggest that there is a 
destructive association between opportunism and the damaging effect on buyer performance 
was evident from the interview data. The choice between formal contracting – such as 
evaluation systems, supplier selection and on-going monitoring – and informal contracting, 
which builds on the relational view and emphasise trust and communication, is however not a 
straightforward decision. It appears that the optimal solution to reducing opportunistic 
behaviour is one where the two governance mechanism (formal vs. informal) are treated as 
compliments.  
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